

536. 1. There is one key element in that claim/assumption by Doyle, it is MISLEADING.
537. 2. Doyle assumes particular belief about the thoughts of Mr Hear, in that due to No submission being advanced by Hear re making submissions to Governor, therefore Watson accepts his submissions to the Board were his 'all-in opportunity', which shows Doyle falsely believes that if Watson wanted to specifically submit to the Governor, then Watson should have and would have done so. Doyle was wrong to believe Watson, or any lifer, having Board's release recommendation, after Board forwards such recommendations to Governor (CSA. s. 67(6)(b) [100.1]), then has 'right to submit anything to Governor' about their recommendation from the Board, because, unless an exceptional circumstance, then the lifer does not, and if such circumstance did arise, it would be submitted to Board only, who would then onforward to Governor. Nothing is permitted from lifer direct to Governor. Additionally, what could the lifer possibly submit to Governor? The notion is ridiculous. Other than to submit something along the lines of 'Dear Governor, the Board has recommended my release on parole (and I'm very happy about that), considering the lifer has no right of claim to be informed of the specifics, pursuant to CSA. s. 67(6)(b), which the Board forwarded to Governor, what else is there to add? Therefore, to suggest even that lifer might want to inform/submit anything to the Governor about Governor's pending considerations (CSA. s. 67(7) [101.1]), is an off-balance and illogical claim/suggestion by Doyle. An exceptional event and/or circumstance may exist, after normal submissions to the Board, and after Board made determinations CSA. ss. 67(6), 67(6)(a), 67(6)(a)(i), 67(6)(a)(ii), and then after operational effect (by the Board), of CSA. s. 67(6)(b), at which point the lifer should inform the Board, who then must onforward to the Governor [29.1] as 'relevant recent event UPDATE'. Doyle has FALSELY AFFORDED JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO THE GOVERNOR [29.1], IN REAL EFFECT BEING 'EQUAL TO THAT IN "OSHEA", BEING "77.A", WHICH IS MONUMENTALLY ERRONEOUS, AS WATSON IS NOT A '77.A' LIFER, AND THEREFORE MUST NOT BE REGARDED BY THE STATE, OR THE COURT, AS AN OPERATIONALLY CHARACTERISTIC

FEATURE OF WATSON'S PAROLE APPLICATION (BECAUSE A "T.A." REQUIRES ~~THE~~ PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATIONS AND REPORTS, IS INCARCERATED "AT GOVERNOR'S Pleasure", AND IS NOT A STANDARD LIFE AS DEFINED WITHIN CSA, s. 67), RATHER, THE COURT MUST ONLY REGARD AND TREAT WATSON AS A STANDARD LIFE, AS DEFINED PURSUANT TO CSA, s. 67.

545. 3.

CARRYING AN EVEN GREATER ERROR BY THE COURT, IS THEIR FALSE AND SERIOUSLY MISLEADING, MISREPRESENTATIVE CLAIM THAT GOVERNOR HAS ANY JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY, OPERATIONAL POWER, RIGHT TO RECEIVE (VESTED JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER), RIGHT TO THEN CONSIDER (PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER), RIGHT TO MAKE DETERMINATION (ABOUT PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER, WHEREBY NOT ONLY THE BOARD OPERATES BELIEVING GOVERNOR [29.]

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HAS LEGAL, JURISDICTION COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE AND CONSIDER FULL PAROLE APPLICATION IN ITS ENTIRETY (INCLUDING LAWFUL RIGHT TO OVER-RULE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION TO RELEASE LIFE ON PAROLE), FROM THE BOARD PURSUANT TO EFFECT OF BOTH CSA, s. 67(6)(b) AND CSA, s. 67(7) ([100. AND 101.]), BUT ALSO THAT THE GOVERNOR [29.] OPERATES BELIEVING THAT IT HAS (OR AT THE VERY LEAST ACTING AS IF IT HAS) LEGAL [AND] JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE FULL PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER (AND VESTED JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO RESPECT/DENY SUCH APPLICATION OUTRIGHT), TO THEN CONSIDER FULL PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER

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(AND WITH VESTED JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO ~~RESPECT~~ RESPECT/DENY SUCH APPLICATION WITH DETERMINATION OF FULL PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER (AND THE PREREQUISITE VESTED JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY, TO IN FACT AND LAW THEN DELIVER A DETERMINATION TOWARDS FULL PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER, EITHER TO PERMIT PAROLE RELEASE OF ~~THE~~ LIFE OR TO RESPECT/DENY SUCH APPLICATION FOR PAROLE RELEASE OUTRIGHT), HOWEVER, AS EVIDENCED ABOVE IN THIS DOCUMENT, PARTICULARLY PART 9, STATUTE TRACKING OF THE SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OF BOARD, AND OF GOVERNOR [29.] (RE ~~THE~~ PAROLE APPLICATIONS BY STANDARD LIFE PURSUANT TO CSA, s. 67), AND RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] COMPETENCE AS DEFINED WITHIN CHAPTERS I, II AND III [3.], AS DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT, CLEARLY SHOWS BY WAY OF SPECIFIC AND

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TARGET WORDING WITHIN STATUTE (CSA, AND IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE MEANING AND INTENTIONS OF PARLIAMENT, WHO IN FACT DEFINED AND ADMITTED SPECIFIC MEANING AS

THE INTENTIONS OF PARLIAMENT FOR FOUNDATION STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF SAME, THERE MUST EXIST IN CLEAR WORDS WITHIN AMENDMENTS TO SAID STATUTE, A SPECIFIC

RE-DEFINING OF SAID MEANING, CONSISTENT WITH [64.7], THAT AS FAR AS A 'STANDARD LIFER' IS CONCERNED (CSA, s. 67), FOR THE PURPOSE ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH STANDARD LIFER APPLYING FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE (CSA, s. 67), THE GOVERNOR

[29.7], SINCE AT LEAST 1983 ([123, 124, 125, 126, 127, AND 128.7]), EVEN UNTIL AS RECENT AS 1-1-2016, IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, HAS NOT HAD ANY 'LEGAL', 'CONSTITUTIONAL', OR 'STATUTORY' JURISDICTION OR COMPETENCE OR AUTHORITY (IN ANY FORM),

TO 'RECEIVE' SAID LIFER'S 'FULL PAROLE APPLICATION' (WITH ANY POWER TO LAWFULLY DENY/REJECT SAME OUTRIGHT), TO THEN CONSIDER SAID LIFER'S 'FULL PAROLE APPLICATION' (WITH ANY POWER TO LAWFULLY DENY/REJECT SAME OUTRIGHT), OR TO THEN MAKE FORMAL DETERMINATION ABOUT SAID LIFER'S 'FULL PAROLE APPLICATION' (WITH ANY POWER TO DENY/REJECT SAME OUTRIGHT), AS SUCH VESTED JURISDICTIONAL

COMPETENCE HAS ONLY BEEN HELD BY THE PAROLE BOARD (TO RECEIVE, CONSIDER, TO THEN MAKE CONSTITUTIONALLY AUTHORISED DETERMINATION CSA, s. 67(6) (AS SPECIFICALLY CONFERENCE TRACKED, ABOVE, WITHIN PART. 9), AND AT THE FOUNDATION DETERMINATION WITHIN CSA, s. 67(6) "...AND, IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS, THE BOARD -" AT WHICH POINT THE BOARD THEN MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS (CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i)) AND

CSA, s. 67(6)(a)(i)), WHICH ARE ONLY CREATED AFTER EMPLOYMENT AND INVOCATION OF CSA, s. 67(6)(a), WHICH IS ONLY AFTER BOARD HAS DETERMINED WHICH OF THE TWO ABSOLUTES (RECOMMEND PAROLE OR REJECT PAROLE [100, TO THEN 101, OR

100, TO THEN 107.7], IT WILL ADOPT), AND SO, FOR THE COURT TO ACT UNDER THE FALSE BELIEF (AS DESCRIBED MORE PRECISELY WITHIN PART. 9, IBID), THAT THE GOVERNOR [29.7] HAS JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL (LI.7) COMPETENCE (AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF WATSON'S JUDGMENT), TO RECEIVE FULL PAROLE APPLICATION (BY LIFER APPLICANT), TO CONSIDER FULL PAROLE APPLICATION (BY LIFER APPLICANT), AND TO DETERMINE FULL PAROLE APPLICATION (BY LIFER APPLICANT), IS A FUNDAMENTALLY ERRONEOUS BELIEF, ERRONEOUS DECISION

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BORNE FROM AND BASED ON AND RELIED UPON SAME ERRONEOUS BELIEF, WHERE THE

DECISIONS ARE IN FACT DECISION TO WRONGLY GIVE GOVERNOR [29.]

PURPORTED JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENT RIGHT TO REJECT LIFE'S PAROLE

APPLICATION, AND JURISDICTION TO RECEIVE FULL PAROLE APPLICATION BY LIFE

APPLICANT WITH PURPORTED COMPETENCE TO CONSIDER SAME AND REJECT SAME IF THE

CABINET SO DESIRES? (THOUGH RECEIVED DIRECT FROM THE BOARD, NOT DIRECT FROM THE

LIFE APPLICANT), AND WHERE THE COURTS' FRAUDULENT REASONING IS

DUE TO THE COURT INERTLY AND INCOMPETENTLY APPLYING THE HCA REASONING FROM

O'SHEA [205.], WHICH WAS FOR A '77.A' PRISONER OF WHICH WATSON WAS

CLEARLY NOT? SUCH 'DECISIONS' BY THE COURT, TO APPLY O'SHEA, WAS A

serious FAILURE BY THE COURT TO ACCURATELY IDENTIFY THE STRICT JURISDICTION

OF THE BOARD, GOVERNOR [29.], AND RESPECTIVE PARTYS RIGHT TO PRODUCE

'OUTCOME', BEING TO RECOMMEND PAROLE OR REJECT PAROLE RELEASE, AND THE

'OUTCOME' DETERMINED BY THE COURT PROPER (IN WATSON), IN THEIR FINAL

Decision (WHICH WAS TO REFUSE/REJECT WATSON'S COMPLAINT), WAS ONLY ARRIVED

AT AS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF THE COURTS MULTITUDE OF MINI DECISIONS, IT MADE

THROUGHOUT ITS CONSIDERATION PRIOR TO (RULING/JUDGMENT), AND LEADING TO (RULING/

JUDGMENT), WHICH WRONGLY AFFORDED DUE TO COURTS INCOMPETENCE, THE HCA

JUDGMENT IN O'SHEA [205.]. THE APPLICATION OF O'SHEA [205.] BY THE COURT

IN WATSON, MEANT THAT DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO LAW ([65.]), HAD NO

CHANCE OF BEING OBSERVED IN SAID COURTS FINAL DETERMINATION, THEREBY

TAINTING BEYOND REPAIR THE ABILITY OF SAID COURT TO MAKE PROPER

JUDGMENT, INSTEAD, ARRIVE AT A JUDGMENT CREATED FROM FALSE AUTHORITY

(WHICH THE COURT GAVE GOVERNOR [29.]), FALSE PERMISSION (WHICH THE COURT

ALLOWED BOARD TO USE TO THEN ONFORWARD THE WHOLE PAROLE APPLICATION TO GOVERNOR,

WITH FALSE CLAIM (BY GOVERNOR), OF ENTITLEMENT TO ~~THE~~ OVER-TURN BOARDS

FORMAL RECOMMENDATION TO RELEASE LIFE ON PAROLE), AND FALSE STATUTORY

(CSA), MEANING OF WORDS IN STATUTE RELATING TO CSA, S. 67 LIFE AND A

"77.A" (GOVERNORS' PRAGMATIC) PRISONER. At the time of WATSON'S HEARING

(2010), AND WITHOUT ANY REGARD TO [102.] (WHICH WAS ILLEGALLY ASSENTED DUE

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- TO IT BREACHING [28.], THE GOVERNOR [29.] WAS ONLY PERMITTED TO RECEIVE FROM THE BOARD (CSA. s. 67(6)(b) [100.], IN ACCORDANCE WITH CSA. s. 67(7), BOARD RECOMMENDATION CSA. s. 67(6)(a)(i) AND BOARD RECOMMENDATION CSA. s. 67(6)(a)(ii), AND AT NO TIME DID THE GOVERNOR [29.] HOLD ANY LEGAL JURISDICTION, LEGAL COMPETENCE OR LEGAL AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE FROM THE BOARD, OR THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, THE WHOLE 'PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER', AS IF TO PERFORM THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF CSA. ss. 67(1), 67(2), 67(3), 67(3A), 67(4), 67(5) AND 67(6), BUT DONE BY GOVERNOR [29.] RATHER THAN THE BOARD, AND YET THE GOVERNOR [29.] DID IN FACT ACT AS IF IT HAD SUCH JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY, AND THE GOVERNOR [29.] DID ALSO ILLEGALLY GIVE ITSELF 'JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY' (AS IF TO APPLY O'SHEA [205.] TO ITSELF), ALBEIT ILLEGALLY, THEREFORE GIVING ITSELF FALSE/FRAUDULENT AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION, WHICH ILLEGALLY VIOLATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CH. II (INTRINSIC TO LAWFUL CONDUCT BY EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT WHO ACTS WITHIN THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION AND COMPETENCE UNDER CH. II [1. AND 3.]), TO THEN PERFORM A 'CONSIDERATION' OF THE WHOLE OF WATSON'S PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER (THEREBY EXCEEDING COMPETENT JURISDICTION), AND ~~THE~~ THEN PERFORMED A DETERMINATION/JUDGMENT WHICH IT HAD NO LEGAL AUTHORITY, OR COMPETENCE, OR JURISDICTION TO PERFORM, BEING 'DENY/REJECT WATSON'S PAROLE APPLICATION OUTRIGHT', GOVERNOR [29.] HAD NO COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO MAKE SUCH DETERMINATION OR JUDGMENT (ULTRA VIRES). THE COURT, BY APPLYING O'SHEA [205.] AS AN AUTHORITY FOR JURISDICTION, RE LIEF APPLYING FOR PAROLE, WAS IN FACT UNLAWFULLY (BY NOT HAVING JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO MAKE SUCH RULING), AND ILLEGALLY (BY ACTION) DETERMINATIONS (WITHIN REASONS PRIOR TO JUDGMENT), AND JUDGMENT PROPER (JUDGMENT MADE IN CONTRADICTION (REASONS FOR) TO ACTUAL STATUTE MEANING AND PARLIAMENTARY INTENTIONS PER HANSARD), WHICH, BY ITS PARTICULARS, ILLEGALLY ASSISTED THE ILLEGAL CONDUCT PERPETRATED BY THE PAROLE BOARD, GOVERNOR AND CABINET AGAINST WATSON, TO DENY/REFUSE TO PAROLE RELEASE WATSON, RESSENTENCE WATSON (WITHOUT USING SENTENCING COURT)).
555. GOVERNOR [29.] RATHER THAN THE BOARD, AND YET THE GOVERNOR [29.] DID IN FACT ACT AS IF IT HAD SUCH JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY, AND THE GOVERNOR [29.] DID ALSO ILLEGALLY GIVE ITSELF 'JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY' (AS IF TO APPLY O'SHEA [205.] TO ITSELF), ALBEIT ILLEGALLY, THEREFORE GIVING ITSELF FALSE/FRAUDULENT AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION, WHICH ILLEGALLY VIOLATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CH. II (INTRINSIC TO LAWFUL CONDUCT BY EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT WHO ACTS WITHIN THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION AND COMPETENCE UNDER CH. II [1. AND 3.]), TO THEN PERFORM A 'CONSIDERATION' OF THE WHOLE OF WATSON'S PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER (THEREBY EXCEEDING COMPETENT JURISDICTION), AND ~~THE~~ THEN PERFORMED A DETERMINATION/JUDGMENT WHICH IT HAD NO LEGAL AUTHORITY, OR COMPETENCE, OR JURISDICTION TO PERFORM, BEING 'DENY/REJECT WATSON'S PAROLE APPLICATION OUTRIGHT', GOVERNOR [29.] HAD NO COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO MAKE SUCH DETERMINATION OR JUDGMENT (ULTRA VIRES). THE COURT, BY APPLYING O'SHEA [205.] AS AN AUTHORITY FOR JURISDICTION, RE LIEF APPLYING FOR PAROLE, WAS IN FACT UNLAWFULLY (BY NOT HAVING JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO MAKE SUCH RULING), AND ILLEGALLY (BY ACTION) DETERMINATIONS (WITHIN REASONS PRIOR TO JUDGMENT), AND JUDGMENT PROPER (JUDGMENT MADE IN CONTRADICTION (REASONS FOR) TO ACTUAL STATUTE MEANING AND PARLIAMENTARY INTENTIONS PER HANSARD), WHICH, BY ITS PARTICULARS, ILLEGALLY ASSISTED THE ILLEGAL CONDUCT PERPETRATED BY THE PAROLE BOARD, GOVERNOR AND CABINET AGAINST WATSON, TO DENY/REFUSE TO PAROLE RELEASE WATSON, RESSENTENCE WATSON (WITHOUT USING SENTENCING COURT)).
556. GOVERNOR [29.] HAD NO COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO MAKE SUCH DETERMINATION OR JUDGMENT (ULTRA VIRES). THE COURT, BY APPLYING O'SHEA [205.] AS AN AUTHORITY FOR JURISDICTION, RE LIEF APPLYING FOR PAROLE, WAS IN FACT UNLAWFULLY (BY NOT HAVING JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO MAKE SUCH RULING), AND ILLEGALLY (BY ACTION) DETERMINATIONS (WITHIN REASONS PRIOR TO JUDGMENT), AND JUDGMENT PROPER (JUDGMENT MADE IN CONTRADICTION (REASONS FOR) TO ACTUAL STATUTE MEANING AND PARLIAMENTARY INTENTIONS PER HANSARD), WHICH, BY ITS PARTICULARS, ILLEGALLY ASSISTED THE ILLEGAL CONDUCT PERPETRATED BY THE PAROLE BOARD, GOVERNOR AND CABINET AGAINST WATSON, TO DENY/REFUSE TO PAROLE RELEASE WATSON, RESSENTENCE WATSON (WITHOUT USING SENTENCING COURT)).

ASSISTING THE STATE GOVERNMENT TO PERPETRATE THE LIE AND PERPETUATE THE FALSE AUTHORITY, FALSE JURISDICTION AND FALSE COMPETENCE WHICH STATE GOVERNMENT ~~REASONABLY~~ ^{FRAUDULENTLY} GIVES GOVERNOR [29.], IN REGARD TO PROCESS OF LIFERS APPLYING FOR PAROLE (PURSUANT TO CSA. s. 67.), WHERE SAID ASSISTANCE IS ACHIEVED BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED AND NEGLECTED TO CONFINED THEIR JUDGMENT PROPER, TO ONLY WHAT IS DEFINED IN STATUTE (CSA), AT THE RELEVANT TIME SO AS TO IDENTIFY 'TIME CRIME HAPPENED', AND THE SPECIFIC SENTENCING STANDARDS OPERATING IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA AT THAT TIME, AND NOT JUST OPERATIONAL SENTENCING STANDARDS FROM WHEN WATSON'S CRIME HAPPENED, IT IS THOSE STANDARDS SPECIFIC TO A CSA. s. 67, 'LIFER', AND AT NO TIME SHOULD WATSON BE TREATED, REGARDED OR SENTENCED IN LINE WITH "77A.", WHICH IS WHAT O'SHEA WAS SENTENCED AS ([205.]).

see [204. (para. 84.)]:

"BUT IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT MASON CJ DID NOT SUGGEST ANY LIMITATION ON THE SCOPE OF THE POWER OF THE DECISION MAKING AUTHORITY WHEN CONSIDERING THE

RECOMMENDATION MADE TO IT... WHEN ONE HAS REGARD TO WHAT MASON CJ SAID A LITTLE EARLIER IN HIS REASONS, WHERE HE REFERRED TO THE ROLE OF THE CABINET AND THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL IN RELATION TO PRISONERS DETAINED AT THE GOVERNORS PLEASURE. HE SAID AT 388:

"IN THE MAKING OF A DECISION UNDER s. 77A "

THE COURT ILLEGALLY TREATED WATSON UNDER THE SAME SENTENCING CONDITION ("77A."), AS O'SHEA ([205.]), AND THEREFORE, BY THE INCOMPETENT AND NEGLIGENCE HAND OF THAT COURT (IN WATSON), THE COURT (CORUM) WAS AN ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT (THEIR JUDGMENT PROPER, COMPOUNDED THE ILLEGAL ACTIONS OF THE STATE, WHO ILLEGALLY USED CABINET TO REFUSE PAROLE RELEASE TO WATSON, AND DID SO BY FRAUDULENT/ILLEGAL USE OF THE STATE GOVERNMENTS' CH. II AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION [3.], WHICH IT LAWFULLY RECEIVED FROM THE CONSTITUTION [1. AND 3.], THEN THE STATE GOVERNMENT ILLEGALLY CLAIMED AND GAVE ITSELF A PURPORTED JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE, REGARDING PROCESS

ELEMENTS AND ARENAS RELATING TO CSA, s. 67. LIFERS APPLYING FOR RELEASE ON

PAROLE, WHICH IN FACT AND LAW WERE NOT LAWFULLY GIVEN (BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT, TO ITSELF), AND WERE NOT LAWFULLY RECEIVED BY GOVERNOR AND EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT/CABINET (FROM THE STATE GOVERNMENT, TO ITSELF), IN ADDITION TO OPERATIONALLY BEING CONTRARY TO STATUTORY MANDATE (CSA), AND PARLIAMENTARY INTENTIONS, YET, THE STATE GOVERNMENT STILL DID IT ANYWAY).

562. PARA. 66: "...THE OTHER TWO BASES ADVANCED BY MR MEAD RAISE A QUESTION AS TO THE FUNCTION OF THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL UNDER s. 67(7) OF THE CSA. IN PARTICULAR, TO WHAT MATTERS MAY THE GOVERNOR HAVE REGARD IN MAKING A DECISION UNDER s. 67(7)?"

563. 1. THERE ARE TWO KEY ELEMENTS, BOTH ARE INTRINSICALLY LINKED TO EACH OTHER, AND ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO THE PURPOSE OF WATSON'S CHALLENGE AGAINST THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT.

564. 2. PART. 9. OF THIS DOCUMENT SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIES THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT (L1,1) JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR, AND GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL [29.1], WITH SPECIFIC RELEVANCE TO A 'STANDARD LIFER' (IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA), WHO IS APPLYING FOR PAROLE RELEASE, PURSUANT TO AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH CSA, s. 67, NOT ONLY AS AT TIME OF WATSON'S SENTENCING (AND THE PROPER AND COMPETENT SENTENCING STANDARDS IMPOSED UPON WATSON, BY THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT, AT THAT TIME (BEING MID 1980'S), AND THE AUTHORITY OF CH. III AND 3.1 WHICH PROTECTED THE ABSOLUTE COMPETENCE OF THE COURT THAT IMPOSED WATSON'S SENTENCE UPON HIM), BUT ALSO, UP TO AND INCLUDING THE TIME OF WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT. IN EFFECT, PART. 9. (IBID), PROVIDES STATUTE TRACKING OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE (AUTHORITY AND EXPLICIT JURISDICTION), IDENTIFYING THE EXACT HOLDER OF COMPETENCE BETWEEN THE PAROLE BOARD, THE GOVERNOR (AS AN INDIVIDUAL), AND THE GOVERNOR [29.1] (IN COUNCIL), AND THE RIGHTS ACCRUED BY WATSON PER IMPOSED SENTENCE, AND WHERE AND WHY AND HOW WATSON ACHIEVED PROTECTION OF HIS IMPOSED SENTENCE, AND WHO AND HOW WATSON PROTECTED ACCRUED RIGHTS WERE STOLEN FROM HIM (BY THE SOUTH

566. Australian Government), and said protected accrued rights were breached and repeatedly violated (by the South Australian Government), and, how the Court (for said Judicial Review), monumentally failed to protect and uphold the Authority, Competence and Jurisdiction (at relevant periods), of the Constitution [1.], the Judiciary imposing sentence upon Watson [3.], The Parliament who created and passed Bill which became Statute (Sentencing Act), properly and competently applied to and imposed upon Watson (mid 1980s), and the accrued rights therein defined and protected in Law. The "Function of the Governor" was in fact and Law and Statute (CSA), as at the time of Watson's 2010 Judgment, was to provide, on behalf of the Royal Hand, Royal Approval (by way of written consent and signature), to the formal Decision by the Board, who did make such formal decision on behalf of the South Australian Government (as the sole, vested, competent, jurisdictional Authority to make such Decision), to recommend release on parole of a respective life applicant. Said "Function is a mandatory act, specified in Statute CSA, ss. 67(6) and 67(7). Where the decision to release life on parole" CSA, ss. 67(6), is made, the Absolute form of Board's preliminary discretion, is determined as "Parole Release" (otherwise it could only be CSA, ss. 67(9)), identified clearly in Statute as "and, if the Board so recommends (CSA, ss. 67(6)). At such point, the Board's secondary discretion (as the preliminary discretion is no longer a discretion, it is an Absolute), is actioned at CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i), which is to "recommend day of, at CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i), and recommend period of, at CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i), and then, per mandatory statutory event (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), must forward Board's Determinations for both CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i) and 67(6)(a)(ii) "to the Governor" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), but, not just "forward a copy of its recommendations to the Governor" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), it is in fact, "forward to Governor", "for approval" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), which the Governor must do, per mandate in Statute, therefore, "function of Governor is to "approve" Board's two recommendations (CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i))
567. Respective life applicant. Said "Function is a mandatory act, specified in Statute CSA, ss. 67(6) and 67(7). Where the decision to release life on parole" CSA, ss. 67(6), is made, the Absolute form of Board's preliminary discretion, is determined as "Parole Release" (otherwise it could only be CSA, ss. 67(9)), identified clearly in Statute as "and, if the Board so recommends (CSA, ss. 67(6)). At such point, the Board's secondary discretion (as the preliminary discretion is no longer a discretion, it is an Absolute), is actioned at CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i), which is to "recommend day of, at CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i), and recommend period of, at CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i), and then, per mandatory statutory event (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), must forward Board's Determinations for both CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i) and 67(6)(a)(ii) "to the Governor" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), but, not just "forward a copy of its recommendations to the Governor" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), it is in fact, "forward to Governor", "for approval" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), which the Governor must do, per mandate in Statute, therefore, "function of Governor is to "approve" Board's two recommendations (CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i))
568. Statute CSA, ss. 67(6) and 67(7). Where the decision to release life on parole" CSA, ss. 67(6), is made, the Absolute form of Board's preliminary discretion, is determined as "Parole Release" (otherwise it could only be CSA, ss. 67(9)), identified clearly in Statute as "and, if the Board so recommends (CSA, ss. 67(6)). At such point, the Board's secondary discretion (as the preliminary discretion is no longer a discretion, it is an Absolute), is actioned at CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i), which is to "recommend day of, at CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i), and recommend period of, at CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i), and then, per mandatory statutory event (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), must forward Board's Determinations for both CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i) and 67(6)(a)(ii) "to the Governor" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), but, not just "forward a copy of its recommendations to the Governor" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), it is in fact, "forward to Governor", "for approval" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), which the Governor must do, per mandate in Statute, therefore, "function of Governor is to "approve" Board's two recommendations (CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i))
569. (CSA, ss. 67(6)). At such point, the Board's secondary discretion (as the preliminary discretion is no longer a discretion, it is an Absolute), is actioned at CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i), which is to "recommend day of, at CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i), and recommend period of, at CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i), and then, per mandatory statutory event (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), must forward Board's Determinations for both CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i) and 67(6)(a)(ii) "to the Governor" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), but, not just "forward a copy of its recommendations to the Governor" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), it is in fact, "forward to Governor", "for approval" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), which the Governor must do, per mandate in Statute, therefore, "function of Governor is to "approve" Board's two recommendations (CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i))
570. "to the Governor" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), but, not just "forward a copy of its recommendations to the Governor" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), it is in fact, "forward to Governor", "for approval" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(b)), which the Governor must do, per mandate in Statute, therefore, "function of Governor is to "approve" Board's two recommendations (CSA, ss. 67(6)(a)(i))

AND 67(6)(A)(II), AND THERE IS NO NEGATIVE ~~REQUIREMENT~~ FORM TO THE REQUIREMENT IN

STATUTE (CSA), TO "APPROVE" SAME, THEREBY MANDATING GOVERNOR "MUST... APPROVE" (CSA.S. 67(6)(B)). THE GOVERNOR'S "FUNCTION" AS CLEARLY DESCRIBED AND DEFINED WITHIN PART. 9. (AND THROUGHOUT THIS WHOLE DOCUMENT), IS FURTHER REINFORCED AS A VERY NARROW SCOPED AND SEVERELY RESTRICTED FIELD OF AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTIONAL

COMPETENCE, PER SPECIFIC WORDING, WITHIN CSA.S. 67(7), WHICH NOT ONLY STATES EXACTLY WHAT IT RECEIVES FOR "APPROVING", BUT THE FACT THAT IT DOES NOT REFER TO ANY OTHER THING, OTHER THAN WHAT IT

RECEIVES FROM BOARD, AND WHAT IT MUST DO WITH WHAT IT RECEIVES FROM BOARD. THAT IS THE ONLY PERMITTED "FUNCTION" OF THE GOVERNOR, WITHIN THE

CONSTRAINTS OF CSA.S. 67(7). IF THE COURT HAD PROPERLY RE-ESTABLISHED THE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF CSA.SS. 67(6) AND 67(7), RATHER THAN IMPROPERLY AND UNLAWFULLY EMPOWERING "SOUTH AUSTRALIAN

GOVERNMENT THROUGH OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY OF CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, WITH FALSE AUTHORITY, FALSE COMPETENCE, THEN, NOT ONLY WOULD WATSON BE GIVEN A FAIR HEARING BY THE COURT IN 2010, BUT ALSO, THE JUDGMENT PROPER WOULD HAVE ONLY BEEN IN FAVOUR OF WATSON'S COMPLAINT, AND NOT AS IT WAS, WHICH WAS THE ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF O'SHEA [2005], WHO WAS A GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE PRISONER ("77A."), UNLIKE WATSON WHO WAS A "CSA.S. 67. PRISONER".

3. THE SECOND ELEMENT IS DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH CSA.S. 67(6), AS ABOVE DESCRIBED, BECAUSE THE "FUNCTION" OF THE GOVERNOR, PURSUANT TO PURPOSE OF AND FOR CSA.S. 67(7), IS TO CONSIDER AND THEN (ULTIMATELY), "TO APPROVE" THE BOARD'S TWO RECOMMENDATIONS, CSA.SS. 67(6)(A)(I) AND 67(6)(A)(II), WHICH, PER WORDING IN STATUTES, CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT AND CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) ACT, IS AN EXTREMELY NARROW AND LIMITED SCOPE AND JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF GOVERNOR [29.1], REGARDING BOTH CSA.S. 67(6)

AND CSA.S. 67(7). PART. 9. OF THIS DOCUMENT REVEALS IN SPECIFIC DETAIL, THE EXACT JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR RE WATSON'S PLEASURE APPLICATION.

576. It should also not be forgotten or disregarded, when considering and utilising


RELEVANT STATUTE, FOR OPERATIONAL EFFECT BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO MOVE TOWARD AND CLOSER TO THE 'INTENDED RESULT' OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT, WHEN DEALING WITH 'A LIFER APPLYING FOR PAROLE' (PURSUANT TO CSA, s. 67). FOR THIS SPECIFIC REASON, THE CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) ACT [34], HAS A CRUCIAL ASSOCIATION WITH THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT [94], WHEN A LIFER (CSA, s. 67) APPLIES FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE IN THE PRESCRIBED MANNER ([94]). SUCH AN ASSOCIATION IS ILLUSTRATED AS FOLLOWS:

578.

AS FOLLOWS:

LIFER APPLIES FOR PAROLE [94.]

SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS THREE MAIN OPTIONS AVAILABLE.



579.

THE COURT CLEARLY KNEW OF THE 'CRUCIAL ASSOCIATION' BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT'S (NOT THE BOARD, BUT RATHER THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT/AGENCY), INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO WATSON (WHICH WAS 'NEVER TO RELEASE WATSON WHILE HE WAS STILL ALIVE'), AND THE PROPER PROCESSES OF THE PAROLE BOARD, AND OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK IDENTIFYING EXACTLY WHAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT MUST DO, IF GOVERNMENT SEEKS

580. TO LAWFULLY EXTEND/INCREASE (AFTER THE SENTENCING COURT IMPOSED NPP), THE TERM OF LIFE'S INCARCERATION. At Watson [194. (para. 39.)], THE COURT CLEARLY INFORMS ITSELF OF MATERIAL PARTICULARS, RELATING TO RELEVANT STATUTE (CSA AND CLEA), ^{THEN} DESCRIBES FURTHER AT [194. (para. 68.)].

581. "PARA. 76: ... I BEGIN BY CONSIDERING THE SCOPE OF THE POWER VESTED IN THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL BY S. 67(7). Although THAT PROVISION REFERS ONLY TO THE GOVERNOR ORDERING THAT A PRISONER BE RELEASED ON PAROLE, BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION IT CONFERS A POWER TO DECLINE OR REFUSE TO MAKE SUCH AN ORDER."

582. 1. THERE ARE FOUR KEY ELEMENTS, THE FIRST IS THE FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTER OF WATSON'S COMPLAINT/CHALLENGE. THE SECOND, THIRD AND FOURTH ARE FALSE AND SIGNIFICANTLY MISLEADING.

583. 2. PARAGRAPH 76. IN THE JUDGMENT PROPER, IS THE FIRST PARAGRAPH UNDER THE HEADING "CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS", BY BOYLE CJ, AND THEREIN IDENTIFIED, I ACCEPT AS CORRECT AT THAT 'FIRST SENTENCE', THE FOUNDATION OF WATSON'S COMPLAINT FUNDAMENTALLY, WHICH IS, THE SCOPE OF THE POWER/JURISDICTION COMPETENTLY OWNED IN LAW, BY THE GOVERNOR [29.], WITHIN THE SPECIFIC STATUTORY BARRIERS, DESCRIBED IN CLEAR AND SPECIFIC WORDS, BY PARLIAMENT, IN SECTION 67(7), VERBATIM. PART. 9. OF THIS DOCUMENT COMPREHENSIVELY TRACKS AND IDENTIFIES THE SPECIFIC JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF NOT ONLY THE GOVERNOR [29.], BUT ALSO 'PAROLE BOARD', WHAT EACH IS PERMITTED TO DO, REQUIRED TO DO, EXPECTED TO DO, AND PROHIBITED FROM DOING. IF THE COURT HAD IN FACT ACCURATELY TRACKED AND IDENTIFIED, THEN IN CLEAR DESCRIPTION, PROPERLY AND ACCURATELY DETERMINED THE LEGAL OWNER/S OF SPECIFIC COMPETENCE, ASSOCIATED WITH LIFE'S PAROLE APPLICATION, THEN THE COURT WOULD NOT HAVE MADE SO MANY ERRORS AT LAW.

586. 3. THE SECOND KEY ELEMENT, CONTAINS TWO FALSE CLAIMS BY THE COURT, "THE FIRST BEING THAT PROVISION REFERS ONLY THE SECOND BEING GOVERNOR ORDERING THAT A PRISONER BE RELEASED ON PAROLE". THE COURT HAS USED THE 'FIRST BEING' AND 'CONSTRUCTED IT INTO THE 'SECOND BEING', AND FOR THIS CRITICAL REASON THE 'FIRST BEING' IS THEREFORE FALSE BEYOND REPAIR.

585. 585. 584. 583. 582. 581. 580.

588. The 'first being' DOES IN FACT REFER "ONLY TO" A SINGLE TOPIC (WHICH THE

589. COURT THEN CLAIMS IS (RE THE 'SECOND BEING'), GOVERNOR ORDERING RELEASE ON

590. PAROLE), BUT IN FACT AND WORDS, THE ENTIRE SUBJECT MATTER OF

591. CSA. s. 67(7) IS ONLY "THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS" (CSA. s. 67(7) [101.3],

592. WHICH ARE RECOMMENDATION CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(1), AND RECOMMENDATION

593. THERE IS NO OTHER TOPIC OR SUBJECT MATTER

594. PERMITTED WITHIN THE VERY SPECIFIC AND CLEAR WORDING OF CSA. s. 67(7), NO

REFERENCE IN ANY FORM TO 'PAROLE ELIGIBILITY' OR 'PERMISSION FOR PAROLE'

RELEASE, ONLY 'WHEN RELEASED ON ~~THE~~ PAROLE' AND 'DURATION OF PAROLE'. PART. 9. OF THIS DOCUMENT EXTENSIVELY DESCRIBES AND IDENTIFIES PURPOSE

OF CSA. s. 67(7), AND JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE THEREIN ATTACHED AND

EMPPOWERED FOR THAT SOLE PURPOSE, WHICH IS TO RECEIVE AND THEN ULTIMATELY

APPROVE THE TWO SPECIFIC ITEMS FROM THE BOARD, PER CSA. ss. 67(6)(B).

IT IS INCREDIBLE THAT THE COURT HAS CLEARLY APPRECIATED AND ADMITTED THAT

CSA. s. 67(7) "REFERS ONLY TO" (ONE PARTICULAR MATTER/TOPIC), WHICH I HAVE

HIGHLIGHTED INTO 'FIRST BEING', BUT RATHER THAN ONLY ASSOCIATE THE

"ONLY" CONDITION WITH JUST WHAT IS WORDED IN STATUTE (CSA. s. 67(7)),

THE COURT HAS FALSELY CLAIMED THAT CSA. s. 67(7) "ONLY" "REFERS TO"

GOVERNOR "ORDERING THAT A PRISONER BE "RELEASED ON PAROLE".

LEAVING FIRST BEING FOR A MOMENT, TO ADDRESS THE ~~COURT~~ COURT'S VERY

SERIOUS AND FLAGRANT DISREGARD FOR STATUTE WORDING (CSA. ss. 67(6),

67(6)(A), 67(6)(A)(1), 67(6)(A)(11), 67(6)(B), AND 67(7)), WHICH APPEARS TO BE THE

RESULT OF THE COURT NOT OBSERVING THE ACTUAL 'WORDS' OF STATUTE, THEN

APPLYING LEGAL MEANING TO THE WORDS PROPER, BUT INSTEAD, APPLYING THE

COURT'S OWN MEANING, THEN, CLAIMING THE HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, O'SHEA

[205.3], IS THE AUTHORITY ON THE SUBJECT MATTER AND AS SUCH MUST BE ACCEPTED.

IN SUCH AN OPERATIONAL MOVE, THE COURT IS 'CREATING' (WITHIN THEIR (DOYLES)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT), AN AUTHORITY FOR THE PAROLE BOARD TO SEND LETTERS

PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER, TO GOVERNOR, EXCEPT THE COURT IS NOT PARLIAMENT

(PURSUANT TO CH. I [3.3]), AND THEREFORE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CREATE SUCH

AN AUTHORITY WITHIN THE PAROLE BOARD, AND SO THE COURT IS OPERATIONALLY ALSO
ACTING OUTSIDE CONSTITUTIONAL (C.I.) COMPETENCE, BY (IN REAL EFFECT),
EMPOWERING THE PAROLE BOARD WITH A FALSE/FRAUDULENT AUTHORITY AND
FALSE/FRAUDULENT JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, AND CONSEQUENTIALLY,
ALSO, THE COURT IS CREATING (WITHIN THEIR (BOYLE'S) REASONS FOR JUDGMENT),
AN AUTHORITY FOR THE GOVERNOR [29.1] TO RECEIVE FROM THE PAROLE BOARD,
THE LIFE'S PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER (EXCEPT THE COURT IS NOT PARLIAMENT
(PURSUANT TO CH. I [3.1], AND THEREFORE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO
CREATE SUCH AN AUTHORITY WITHIN THE GOVERNOR, GOVERNOR [29.1],
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL/CABINET, AND SO THE COURT IS OPERATIONALLY ALSO ACTING
OUTSIDE CONSTITUTIONAL (C.I.) COMPETENCE, BY (IN REAL EFFECT), EMPOWERING
THE GOVERNOR [29.1] WITH A FALSE/FRAUDULENT AUTHORITY AND
FALSE/FRAUDULENT JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, AND YET, AT NO TIME
DID THE COURT EVER HOLD COMPETENCE TO APPLY GOVERNORS (C.I.) JURISDICTION,
GOVERNORS (C.I.) AUTHORITY, OR GOVERNORS [29.1] ABSOLUTE VETO POWER
FROM O'SHEA [205.1] ([204. (PARAS. 83, 84)]), WHO WASN'T EVEN A LIFER
BECAUSE O'SHEA [205.1] WAS INCARCERATED UNDER IMPOSED SENTENCE 77A,
"AT GOVERNORS' PLEASURE", NOT A LIFER PER CONVICTION FOR MURDER,
TO WATSON'S COMPLAINT AGAINST THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, ESPECIALLY
CONSIDERING THAT WATSON WAS A LIFER, WAS NOT EVER SENTENCED PURSUANT TO
PROVISION '77A' (UNLIKE O'SHEA [205.1], THEREFORE, THE ACTION BY THE
COURT TO "APPLY" "O'SHEA" [205.1] TO THEIR REASONS FOR JUDGMENT,
WAS AN IMPROPER ACTION IN (AT THE VERY LEAST), A JURISDICTIONAL SENSE (ULTRA
VIRES), AS DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT, THERE IS NO LEGISLATED LANDSCAPE
WITHIN THE CSA (BETWEEN [46.1] AND DELIVERY OF JUDGMENT IN WATSON [194.1]),
WHICH IN ANY WAY GIVES GOVERNOR [29.1] ANY JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE,
AND IN EFFECT CONSTITUTIONAL (C.I.) COMPETENCE, OTHER THAN THAT WHICH
IS CLEARLY DESCRIBED AND EXPRESSED IN UNAMBIGUOUS WORDS IN CSA, SS.
67(6), 67(6)(A), 67(6)(A)(I), 67(6)(A)(II), 67(6)(B) AND 67(7) [100. AND 101.1]

596.

596.

597. This document, PARTICULARLY PART. 9. (1810), EXTENSIVELY IDENTIFIES, THEN TRACKS

JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE ASSOCIATED WITH DECIDING AND CONSIDERING, FROM

WITHIN STATUTORY PROVISIONS DESCRIBED IN CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT (AS FAR

BACK AS 1983 ([139, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, AND 128.]), UP TO THE TIME

OF WATSON'S JUDGMENT IN 2010), AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS DESCRIBED IN THE

STATUTES AMENDMENT (TRUTH IN SENTENCING) ACT ([46.]), AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

DESCRIBED WITHIN CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) ACT (FROM PRE [46.] TO

POST [46.]), A LIFE'S SUBMISSION/APPLICATION FOR PAROLE RELEASE, WHICH

THEREIN, MOST FUNDAMENTALLY AND SIGNIFICANTLY, NOT ONLY DOES

CSA, [100. AND 101.] VERY SPECIFICALLY, IN WORDS, DESCRIBE ONLY WHAT

598. MUST BE FORWARDED FROM BOARD TO GOVERNOR [29.], AND ONLY WHAT MUST

BE RECEIVED BY GOVERNOR [29.], FROM BOARD, ONLY WHAT MUST BE

DONE BY GOVERNOR [29.], WITH WHAT IT RECEIVES FROM BOARD, IT ALSO

RELAYS THE INTENTIONS AND REASONS OF PARLIAMENT, ABOUT

JURISDICTION, LIMITATIONS, ETC., IN THE HAND OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT

DURING PROCESSING PHASES OF A LIFE'S PAROLE APPLICATION. WHAT THE COURT

599. DID BY APPLYING O'SHEA [205.] JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR, TO WATSON, WAS TO

UNCONSTITUTIONALLY REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND OBSERVE, IN REAL

OPERATIONAL EFFECT, THE CREATION IN STATUTE ([100. AND 101. AND 126.]), OF

WATSON'S ABSOLUTE AND ACCRUED SENTENCING RIGHTS [45.], INSTEAD,

600. IN REPLACEMENT FOR SUCH ACCRUED, IMPOSED RIGHTS, THE COURT WRONGLY APPLIED

NOT JUST THE WRONG STATUTORY PROVISIONS (RELEVANT TO O'SHEA BUT NOT RELEVANT TO

WATSON), PARTICULARISED IN O'SHEA AS "77A.", WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN

PARTICULARISED IN WATSON AS CSA. S. 67, IT ALSO DENIED WATSON THE

MANDATORY OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF THE REQUIRED APPLICATION, AND OBSERVANCE, OF

SAID ACCRUED RIGHTS, PER CSA. S. 67. (WHICH WAS PARLIAMENT'S INTENTION

WHEN IT APPROVED THE VERY SPECIFICALLY WORDED CSA. SS. 67(6) AND 67(7)).

603. THE COURT CREATED A FALSE AUTHORITY, THEN RELIED ON SUCH FALSE AUTHORITY (IT

APPLIED O'SHEA [205.] TO WATSON, THEN, IN SO DOING, IN A DEFACIO ~~WATSON~~ SENSE,

TREATING WATSON AS A DEFACIO '77A' PRISONER IN THE EYES OF THE

COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF APPLICABLE STATUTORY AUTHORITY, AND STATUTORY (THEREIN) PROVISIONAL COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION, BUT THE COURT WAS WRONG TO DO SO, BECAUSE WATSON'S SENTENCE WASN'T GOVERNORS' REASURE.

604. 4.

THE THIRD KEY ELEMENT, IS A FUNDAMENTAL OBSERVANCE OF WORDED CONSTRUCTION OF A PROVISION IN STATUTE FORM. THE COURT IS STATING, AS IF TO BE AN OPERATIONAL FACT, THAT WITHIN CSA. s. 67(7), THERE IS A HIDDEN AUTHORITY, WHICH ATTACHES TO THE GOVERNOR [29.1], AND EVEN THOUGH YOU CAN'T SEE THE ACTUAL WORDS WRITTEN ANYWHERE IN THE CSA, EMPOWERING WHAT WE (THE COURT), SAY EXISTS WITH ABSOLUTE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, YOU MUST ACCEPT WHAT THE COURT SAYS BECAUSE WE (THE COURT), KNOW WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT, WE ARE TRAINED PROFESSIONALS, AND WE SEE THINGS, INCLUDING SECRET AND HIDDEN AUTHORITIES, WHICH NONE OF YOU CAN SEE BECAUSE YOU DON'T HAVE OUR SPECIAL ABILITIES, OF SEEING HIDDEN JURISDICTION AND HIDDEN AUTHORITY, AND YOU SHOULD NOT FEAR WHAT NONE OF YOU CAN SEE IN WORDS, AS WE OF THIS COURT, SHALL INFORM YOU OF WHAT YOU CAN'T SEE, AND, EVEN THOUGH THE PARLIAMENT DID NOT INCLUDE THE WORDS PROPER, PERTAINING TO SAID HIDDEN AUTHORITY, AND THEREFORE DID NOT DISCUSS OR VOTE (IN EITHER HOUSE), ON SAID 'NO WORDS', WHICH AWARD SAID HIDDEN AUTHORITY TO THE GOVERNOR [29.1], AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), PASS THE LOWER HOUSE BEFORE BEING TABLED IN THE UPPER HOUSE, AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), GET DISCUSSED, DEBATED, CHALLENGED OR EVEN VOTED ON IN THE UPPER HOUSE, INCLUDING (TECHNICALLY), PASS THE UPPER HOUSE BEFORE BEING DIRECTED TO GOVERNOR FOR ASSENT, AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), OBTAIN ASSENT FROM THE ROYAL ARMY (GOVERNOR), AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), BECOME A LEGISLATED AMENDMENT TO THE CSA, YET, IT EXISTS OPERATIONALLY EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE NO ACTUAL WORDS WITHIN CSA, TO PROVE THAT THE SAID HIDDEN AUTHORITY EXISTS, AND, EVEN THOUGH THE ACTUAL WORDS WHICH ARE WRITTEN IN STATUTE AND CAN BE ACTUALLY SEEN, AND WERE DISCUSSED AND DEBATED IN BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, AND WERE PASSED ~~AND~~ BY BOTH HOUSES OF THE PARLIAMENT, AND WERE ASSSENTED AS A LEGISLATED AMENDMENT TO THE CSA IN

605.

FACT, THAT WITHIN CSA. s. 67(7), THERE IS A HIDDEN AUTHORITY, WHICH ATTACHES TO THE GOVERNOR [29.1], AND EVEN THOUGH YOU CAN'T SEE THE ACTUAL WORDS WRITTEN ANYWHERE IN THE CSA, EMPOWERING WHAT WE (THE COURT), SAY EXISTS WITH ABSOLUTE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, YOU MUST ACCEPT WHAT THE COURT SAYS BECAUSE WE (THE COURT), KNOW WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT, WE ARE TRAINED PROFESSIONALS, AND WE SEE THINGS, INCLUDING SECRET AND HIDDEN AUTHORITIES, WHICH NONE OF YOU CAN SEE BECAUSE YOU DON'T HAVE OUR SPECIAL ABILITIES, OF SEEING HIDDEN JURISDICTION AND HIDDEN AUTHORITY, AND YOU SHOULD NOT FEAR WHAT NONE OF YOU CAN SEE IN WORDS, AS WE OF THIS COURT, SHALL INFORM YOU OF WHAT YOU CAN'T SEE, AND, EVEN THOUGH THE PARLIAMENT DID NOT INCLUDE THE WORDS PROPER, PERTAINING TO SAID HIDDEN AUTHORITY, AND THEREFORE DID NOT DISCUSS OR VOTE (IN EITHER HOUSE), ON SAID 'NO WORDS', WHICH AWARD SAID HIDDEN AUTHORITY TO THE GOVERNOR [29.1], AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), PASS THE LOWER HOUSE BEFORE BEING TABLED IN THE UPPER HOUSE, AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), GET DISCUSSED, DEBATED, CHALLENGED OR EVEN VOTED ON IN THE UPPER HOUSE, INCLUDING (TECHNICALLY), PASS THE UPPER HOUSE BEFORE BEING DIRECTED TO GOVERNOR FOR ASSENT, AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), OBTAIN ASSENT FROM THE ROYAL ARMY (GOVERNOR), AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), BECOME A LEGISLATED AMENDMENT TO THE CSA, YET, IT EXISTS OPERATIONALLY EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE NO ACTUAL WORDS WITHIN CSA, TO PROVE THAT THE SAID HIDDEN AUTHORITY EXISTS, AND, EVEN THOUGH THE ACTUAL WORDS WHICH ARE WRITTEN IN STATUTE AND CAN BE ACTUALLY SEEN, AND WERE DISCUSSED AND DEBATED IN BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, AND WERE PASSED ~~AND~~ BY BOTH HOUSES OF THE PARLIAMENT, AND WERE ASSSENTED AS A LEGISLATED AMENDMENT TO THE CSA IN

606.

FACT, THAT WITHIN CSA. s. 67(7), THERE IS A HIDDEN AUTHORITY, WHICH ATTACHES TO THE GOVERNOR [29.1], AND EVEN THOUGH YOU CAN'T SEE THE ACTUAL WORDS WRITTEN ANYWHERE IN THE CSA, EMPOWERING WHAT WE (THE COURT), SAY EXISTS WITH ABSOLUTE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, YOU MUST ACCEPT WHAT THE COURT SAYS BECAUSE WE (THE COURT), KNOW WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT, WE ARE TRAINED PROFESSIONALS, AND WE SEE THINGS, INCLUDING SECRET AND HIDDEN AUTHORITIES, WHICH NONE OF YOU CAN SEE BECAUSE YOU DON'T HAVE OUR SPECIAL ABILITIES, OF SEEING HIDDEN JURISDICTION AND HIDDEN AUTHORITY, AND YOU SHOULD NOT FEAR WHAT NONE OF YOU CAN SEE IN WORDS, AS WE OF THIS COURT, SHALL INFORM YOU OF WHAT YOU CAN'T SEE, AND, EVEN THOUGH THE PARLIAMENT DID NOT INCLUDE THE WORDS PROPER, PERTAINING TO SAID HIDDEN AUTHORITY, AND THEREFORE DID NOT DISCUSS OR VOTE (IN EITHER HOUSE), ON SAID 'NO WORDS', WHICH AWARD SAID HIDDEN AUTHORITY TO THE GOVERNOR [29.1], AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), PASS THE LOWER HOUSE BEFORE BEING TABLED IN THE UPPER HOUSE, AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), GET DISCUSSED, DEBATED, CHALLENGED OR EVEN VOTED ON IN THE UPPER HOUSE, INCLUDING (TECHNICALLY), PASS THE UPPER HOUSE BEFORE BEING DIRECTED TO GOVERNOR FOR ASSENT, AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), OBTAIN ASSENT FROM THE ROYAL ARMY (GOVERNOR), AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), BECOME A LEGISLATED AMENDMENT TO THE CSA, YET, IT EXISTS OPERATIONALLY EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE NO ACTUAL WORDS WITHIN CSA, TO PROVE THAT THE SAID HIDDEN AUTHORITY EXISTS, AND, EVEN THOUGH THE ACTUAL WORDS WHICH ARE WRITTEN IN STATUTE AND CAN BE ACTUALLY SEEN, AND WERE DISCUSSED AND DEBATED IN BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, AND WERE PASSED ~~AND~~ BY BOTH HOUSES OF THE PARLIAMENT, AND WERE ASSSENTED AS A LEGISLATED AMENDMENT TO THE CSA IN

607.

FACT, THAT WITHIN CSA. s. 67(7), THERE IS A HIDDEN AUTHORITY, WHICH ATTACHES TO THE GOVERNOR [29.1], AND EVEN THOUGH YOU CAN'T SEE THE ACTUAL WORDS WRITTEN ANYWHERE IN THE CSA, EMPOWERING WHAT WE (THE COURT), SAY EXISTS WITH ABSOLUTE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, YOU MUST ACCEPT WHAT THE COURT SAYS BECAUSE WE (THE COURT), KNOW WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT, WE ARE TRAINED PROFESSIONALS, AND WE SEE THINGS, INCLUDING SECRET AND HIDDEN AUTHORITIES, WHICH NONE OF YOU CAN SEE BECAUSE YOU DON'T HAVE OUR SPECIAL ABILITIES, OF SEEING HIDDEN JURISDICTION AND HIDDEN AUTHORITY, AND YOU SHOULD NOT FEAR WHAT NONE OF YOU CAN SEE IN WORDS, AS WE OF THIS COURT, SHALL INFORM YOU OF WHAT YOU CAN'T SEE, AND, EVEN THOUGH THE PARLIAMENT DID NOT INCLUDE THE WORDS PROPER, PERTAINING TO SAID HIDDEN AUTHORITY, AND THEREFORE DID NOT DISCUSS OR VOTE (IN EITHER HOUSE), ON SAID 'NO WORDS', WHICH AWARD SAID HIDDEN AUTHORITY TO THE GOVERNOR [29.1], AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), PASS THE LOWER HOUSE BEFORE BEING TABLED IN THE UPPER HOUSE, AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), GET DISCUSSED, DEBATED, CHALLENGED OR EVEN VOTED ON IN THE UPPER HOUSE, INCLUDING (TECHNICALLY), PASS THE UPPER HOUSE BEFORE BEING DIRECTED TO GOVERNOR FOR ASSENT, AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), OBTAIN ASSENT FROM THE ROYAL ARMY (GOVERNOR), AND THEREFORE (ALSO), DID NOT (TECHNICALLY), BECOME A LEGISLATED AMENDMENT TO THE CSA, YET, IT EXISTS OPERATIONALLY EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE NO ACTUAL WORDS WITHIN CSA, TO PROVE THAT THE SAID HIDDEN AUTHORITY EXISTS, AND, EVEN THOUGH THE ACTUAL WORDS WHICH ARE WRITTEN IN STATUTE AND CAN BE ACTUALLY SEEN, AND WERE DISCUSSED AND DEBATED IN BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, AND WERE PASSED ~~AND~~ BY BOTH HOUSES OF THE PARLIAMENT, AND WERE ASSSENTED AS A LEGISLATED AMENDMENT TO THE CSA IN

FACT APPEAR TO BE VERY CLEAR, VERY SPECIFIC, VERY NARROW IN JURISDICTIONAL

SCOPE (CSA. ss. 67(6), 67(6)(a), 67(6)(a)(i), 67(6)(a)(ii), 67(6)(b) AND 67(7)),

AND THEREIN AND THEREFORE AND THEREBY CONTRADICT THE CLAIM BY THE COURT

ABOUT THE 'ALLEGED AND PURPORTED HIDDEN AUTHORITY BEING A REAL THING',

WORRY NOT ABOUT THE DISPARITY IN CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE BETWEEN

WHAT ALL CAN SEE (THE WRITTEN WORDS IN STATUTE), AND WHAT ONLY THAT COURT SAYS

EXISTS (THE HIDDEN AUTHORITY, WITH NO WORDS TO VERIFY SAME), FOR WE OF

THIS COURT SAY IT IS SO, THEREFORE, IT IS SO!!!

WHAT BULLSHIT... The Court illegally disregarded affirmative AND CLEAR

TEXT IN STATUTE, CREATED ITS OWN AUTHORITY AND OWN JURISDICTION TO THEN TELL

ITSELF AND OTHERS, THAT A SECRET THING IS ACTUALLY REAL AND COMPETENT

(HIDDEN AUTHORITY), AND NOT ONLY THAT, BUT ALSO TO ASSIGN THE AUTHORITY,

RE GOVERNOR [29.] FROM O'SHEA [205.], UNLAWFULLY UPON WATSON, ALL OF

WHICH IS IN REAL TEXT FOR ALL TO SEE (STATUTE AND WATSON JUDGMENT).

I AM GENUINELY ASTOUNDED THAT SUCH INCOMPETENT CORUM COULD BE

ALLOWED, FOR SO LONG, TO SO FUNDAMENTALLY MISREPRESENT STATUTORY

AUTHORITY OF CSA. ss. 67(6) AND 67(7). IT IS VERY SIMPLE, IF IT IS NOT

A WRITTEN WORD IN STATUTE, THEN IT DOES NOT EXIST. IT ALSO SUGGESTS

IN THOSE FEW WORDS "BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION" THAT THE COURT IS CLAIMING BY

USING THE WORD "NECESSARY", THAT "THE NEGATIVE FORM OF ITS CLAIMED

HIDDEN AUTHORITY, IS WHERE IT GAINS ITS EXISTENCE". HOWEVER, THAT TOO IS

DISPROVEN BY THE VERY SPECIFIC WRITTEN WORDS WITHIN CSA. ss. 67(6) AND 67(7),

AND THE VERY WORDING THEREIN (AS PART 9, OF THIS DOCUMENT EXTENSIVELY

EXAMINES, TRACKS, VERIFIES AND QUALIFIES), AS SUCH WRITTEN WORDS DEFINE ONLY

WHAT IS PERMITTED BY CSA. ss. 67(6)(A), 67(6)(A)(i), 67(6)(A)(ii), 67(6)(b), AND

67(7), AND, THERE IS NO NEED, WITHIN CSA. ss. 67(6) OR 67(7), FOR ANY ADDITIONAL

OR 'ALTERNATIVE' MEANING/INTERPRETATION BECAUSE THE SOLE PURPOSE FOR

CSA. ss. 67(7) (PER SPECIFIC WORDS IN PRINT FORM FOR ALL TO SEE), IS TO RECEIVE

FROM THE BOARD ITS RECOMMENDED DAY OF RELEASE OF LIFE APPLICANT (CSA. ss. 67(6)(A)(i)),

THEN 67(6)(b), THEN 67(7) "FOR APPROVAL" (CSA. ss. 67(6)(b)), WHICH ULTIMATELY IT

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611.

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MUST APPROVE (AS IS THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT PER STATUTORY DIRECTION), AND TO RECEIVE FROM THE BOARD ITS RECOMMENDED PERIOD OF RELEASE OF LIFE APPLICANT (CSA, ss. 67(6)(A)(i)), THEN 67(6)(B), THEN 67(7) FOR APPROVAL" (CSA, ss. 67(6)(B)), WHICH ULTIMATELY IT MUST APPROVE (AS IS THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT PER STATUTORY DIRECTION). TO FIRST CLAIM (AS IF FACT, BY THE COURT), THAT SOMETHING OTHER THAN THE VERY SPECIFIC WORDING OF CSA, ss. 67(6)(A), 67(6)(B), AND 67(7), IS "IMPLIED" BY SAME (BUT PRODUCE NO WORDS IN STATUTE TO IN ANY WAY SUPPORT, OR EVEN TRY TO PROVE SUCH CLAIM), IS A FANTASY, BECAUSE SUCH COULD ONLY OCCUR IF THE COURT FAILED, NEGLECTED, REFUSED TO REGARD AND TREAT WATSON AS A PRISONER OTHER THAN A STANDARD LIFER, WHO, AS A STANDARD LIFER WOULD ALSO BE PROTECTED BY DUE PROCESS FEATURES OF CSA, ss. 67, FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE COURT TREATED AND REGARDED WATSON ON EQUAL SENTENCING PLATFORM AS A "7A," "GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE," JUST LIKE O'SHEA [205], HOWEVER, THAT COULD NOT LAWFULLY HAPPEN BECAUSE WATSON WAS NOT SENTENCED AS A "7A," "GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE" PRISONER (WATSON WAS ONLY A STANDARD LIFER (PURSUANT TO CSA, ss. 67, PROCESSING PARTICULARS)), AND YET, THAT VERY THING IS EXACTLY WHAT THE INCOMPETENT COURT ACTUALLY DID!!! THERE IS NOTHING TO IMPLY FROM CSA, ss. 67(7), AS IT IS A SELF-SUFFICIENT DIRECTIVE, ITS "WORDING" IS CLEAR, SPECIFIC AND UNAMBIGUOUS, AS IS EXTENSIVELY EXPLAINED AND DESCRIBED WITHIN PART. 9. OF THIS DOCUMENT, AND THEREFORE, THERE IS NOTHING FURTHER TO ADD TO IT, NO "NECESSITY" OF ADDITIONAL WORDS OR MEANINGS, NO "ALLEGED/CLAIMED/PURPORTED HIDDEN AUTHORITY OR JURISDICTION," WHAT IS CLEAR THOUGH, IS WHEN THE CROWN AND/OR COURT TRY TO CREATE AND MANUFACTURE A FALSE/FRAUDULENT JURISDICTION, COMPETENCE AND/OR AUTHORITY, LIKE IN THE WATSON JUDICIAL REVIEW (2010), THE CROWN AND/OR COURT START PURPORTING FANTASY AS FACT, JUST LIKE THIS COURT DID, AND THIS COURT DID MORE THAN JUST CREATE IT AND IMPROPERLY MANUFACTURE IT, IT (THE COURT), ALSO RELIED ON IT AND

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THEN MADE AND DELIVERED FORMAL JUDGMENT WHICH WAS CENTRAL
 "PILLARED" (R.V. STAFFORD [2009] OCA 407, RE "DESTROYING THE CENTRAL PILLAR"
 OF JUDGMENT WHICH IN THIS MATTER IS THE FALSE AUTHORITY, AND FALSE JURISDICTION WHICH
 THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY GAVE TO ITSELF (FOR REASONING LEADING TO JUDGMENT PROPER),
 AND FRAUDULENTLY APPLIED TO WATSON'S SENTENCE (AS DECLARED BY THIS COURT, NOT
 BY WATSON'S ACTUAL SENTENCING COURT OR SENTENCING JUDGE), BY SAID
 "LIE" (WHERE THE 'LIE' IS THE ALLEGED, PURPORTED AND CLAIMED "IMPLICATION"
 TO REFUSE/DECLINE TO APPROVE LIFE'S PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER, AND, AS NO
 SUCH COMPETENCE EXISTS ANYWHERE IN STATUTE (PRE DELIVERY OF WATSON'S 2010
 JUDGMENT), WITHIN CSA, SS. 67(6) OR 67(7), FOR THE GOVERNOR [29.1 TO
 HOLD SAID ALLEGED AUTHORITY, JURISDICTION OR COMPETENCE, THEN, NO COURT SHALL
 ENTRUST ANY BELIEF WHICH CONTRADICTS THE EXPLICIT STATUTORY WORDING
 OF CSA, SS. 67(6) AND 67(7), AND THE INTRINSIC PARLIAMENTARY INTENTIONS
 ATTACHED THERETO, BECAUSE, TO SO ACT WITH CONTRADICTION TO STATUTORY
 WORDING MUST EFFECT NEGATION OF COMPETENCE IN SUCH COURT, AS ONLY A
 COMPETENT COURT WILL ABIDE BY THE VERY SPECIFIC AND SELF-SUFFICIENT WORDING
 OF CSA, SS. 67(6), 67(6)(A), 67(6)(A)(I), 67(6)(A)(II), 67(6)(B) AND 67(7)).
 A FALSE AUTHORITY IS A LIE.

5. THE FOURTH KEY ELEMENT, CONTAINS TWO FALSE CLAIMS BY THE COURT, THE
 FIRST BEING "IT CONFERS A POWER", THE SECOND BEING "TO DECLINE OR REFUSE TO MAKE
 SUCH AN ORDER". THE COURT HAS, IN THE 'FIRST BEING', USED THE WORD "IT" AS
 'THE IDENTIFIER OF CSA, SS. 67(7)' (THEREFORE MEANING AS IF TO SAY 'SECTION (CSA), 67(7)
 CONFERS A POWER'). IN A MANNER OF STRICT INTERPRETATION, CSA, SS. 67(7)
 DOES IN FACT AND LAW 'CONFER A POWER', BUT, THIS IS WHERE THE COURT HAS
 MONUMENTALLY MISREPRESENTED FACT WITH FANTASY. AS PART 9, OF THIS
 DOCUMENT EXTENSIVELY IDENTIFIES, THE 'POWER CONFERRED' BY [101.1 IS
 EXTREMELY NARROW IN ITS JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, AND IS LIMITED TO ONLY
 HAVING (DISCRETIONARY) INFLUENCE OVER CSA, SS. 67(6)(A)(I) AND 67(6)(A)(II),
 AND NOTHING MORE. THE COURT HOWEVER, UNLAWFULLY ATTACHES "IT CONFERS
 A POWER" TO EARLIER TEXT IN THAT SAME PARAGRAPH, "THAT PROVISION REFERS

ONLY TO THE GOVERNOR ORDERING THAT A PRISONER BE RELEASED ON PAROLE, AND SO, BY THE COURT'S FALSE INTERPRETATION AND BELIEF ABOUT "IT CONFERS A POWER" (AS AN ATTEMPT BY THE COURT TO EXPLAIN ITSELF), THE COURT USES "IT CONFERS A POWER" AS A SECONDARY CONSTRUCTION POINT, TO THE COURT'S ERRONEOUSLY CREATED MISREPRESENTATION OF STATUTORY MEANING AND AUTHORITY, AS IT DECLARES IN EARLIER TEXT IN SAME PARAGRAPH BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION (ACTING AS PRIMARY CONSTRUCTION POINT), THEREFORE, "IT CONFERS A POWER" IS A SELF-SERVING STATEMENT OF CLAIM, WITH THE INTENTION BEING TO BOLSTER/PROP-UP "BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION". SAID "POWER" FOR SUCH FALSE APPLICATION, IS A CONTRADICTION TO THE STATUTORY MEANING, WHICH IS ONLY THE POWER OF DISCRETION IT LAWFULLY HOLDS IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT, BETWEEN THE BOARD (AND THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS CSA. ss. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii)), AND THE GOVERNOR [29.] WHO IS REQUIRED (CSA. ss. 67(6)(B) AND 67(7)), TO ULTIMATELY "APPROVE" SAID BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS CSA. ss. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii). THE COURT HAS, IN THE SECOND BEING, USED THE WORD "ORDER" AS AN INTRINSIC ELEMENT OF THE GOVERNOR'S HIDDEN AUTHORITY, BORNE FROM (SAME PARAGRAPH), "BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION" (THEREIN CLAIMING GOVERNOR [29.] FOR WATSON, HAS SAME JURISDICTION AS GOVERNOR [29.] IN OSHEA [205.], WHICH WE NOW APPRECIATE AS FALSE), THEN ATTACHING SELF-SERVING FALSE STATEMENT "IT CONFERS A POWER" AS A CLAIM OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION FOR GOVERNOR [29.] TO OPERATE FROM (EXCEPT, THAT TOO IS A FALSE STATEMENT), TO THEN INTRINSICALLY (PER COURTS FALSE BELIEF AND FALSE CREATION), THE 'FALSE POWER', TO MEAN 'POWER TO ORDER OR DECLINE RELEASE OF PRISONER ON PAROLE' (EXCEPT, THAT TOO IS A FALSE STATEMENT, BECAUSE, WHAT THE BOARD SENDS TO GOVERNOR [29.] FOR APPROVAL, PER CSA. ss. 67(6)(B), IS ONLY RECOMMENDATIONS (CSA. ss. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii)), AND A 'RECOMMENDATION' IS IN FACT JUST AN 'ORDER' WITHOUT ROYAL SIGNATURE, THEREFORE, THE ORDER (TO RELEASE LIFER ON PAROLE), BUT WITHOUT ROYAL SIGNATURE FROM [29.], IS MADE BY THE BOARD, AND ONLY BECOMES AN 'ORDER' WHEN FORMALLY SIGNED BY GOVERNOR [29.], AND SO, NOT ONLY DOES THE GOVERNOR NOT HOLD COMPETENCE TO MAKE AN ORDER (TO RELEASE OR NOT RELEASE

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LITER ON PAROLE), WHICH IS WHAT THE COURT FALSELY CLAIMED GOVERNOR [29.]
HAD THE ABILITY TO DO WITH WATSON, BUT, THE ONLY ORDER AS DESCRIBED IN
CSA. S. 67(7), IS IN FACT 'THE BOARD'S TWO RECOMMENDATIONS (FROM CSA. S. 67(6)(A)),
WITH GOVERNORS [29.] ROYAL SIGNATURE, WHICH THEN, AND ONLY THEN, IS THE
'ORDER'.

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